Carland, John M.. (2000) Combat operations :stemming the tide, May 1965 to October 1966 Washington, DC : Center of Military History United States Army,MLA Citation
Carland, John M.. Combat Operations: Stemming The Tide, May 1965 To October 1966. Washington, DC : Center Of Military History United States Army, 2000. Print.
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Combat operations : stemming the tide, May 1965 to October 1966 /
by John M. Carland.
|Main Author:||Carland, John M.|
|Published:||Washington, DC : Center of Military History United States Army, 2000.|
United States Army in Vietnam.
|Topics:||Vietnam War, 1961-1975 - United States. | Vietnam War, 1961-1975 - Campaigns. | Vietnamkrieg | Geschichte (1965-1966) | United States. Army - History - Vietnam War, 1961-1975. | Etats-Unis. Army.|
|Regions:||Guerre du Viet-Nam (1961-1975) - États-Unis. | USA|
|000||05181cam a2200469 a 4500|
|008||990609s2000 dcuab b 001 0 eng|
|086||0 |aD 114.7/3:C 73/2|
|100||1 |aCarland, John M.,|d1942-|
|245||10|aCombat operations :|bstemming the tide, May 1965 to October 1966 /|cby John M. Carland.|
|260|||aWashington, DC :|bCenter of Military History United States Army,|c2000.|
|300|||axx, 410 p. :|bill., maps (some col.) ;|c25 cm.|
|490||1 |aUnited States Army in Vietnam|
|504|||aIncludes bibliographical references (p. 373-381) and index.|
|505||0 |a1. At the crossroads. The path to war; Decisions to escalate -- 2. Establishing the Bridgeheads. An airborne brigade for III Corps; Reinforcing Bien Hoa; A brigade for Coastal II Corps -- 3. Divisions deploy. The decision to reinforce; command and operational concepts; Building the support base; 1st cavalry division; 1st infantry division; The coming campaign --4. Pressing out from Saigon. Hill 65; Bau Bang; Trung Loi; Nha Mat; Winding down -- 5. Into the highlands. The campaign takes shape; Plei Me under siege; Decision and action ; New targets -- 6.The Pleiku campaign. Before the assault; The fight at X-Ray; The March to Albany; The ambush; An assessment -- 7. Patterns of perseverance. Plans and troops; The Honolulu Conference; Preparing for new battles -- 8. The Saigon corridors. Two new Brigades for III Corps; Northwest of the city; North and East -- 9. Attrition and pacification in Phu Yen. On the coast; The backcountry; The security picture -- 10. Testing in Binh Dinh. Masher/White Wing; Davy Crockett; Crazy Horse -- 11. Spoiling operations on the high plateau. The Highlands Brigade enters combat; The Airmobile Division returns -- 12. New momentum on the coast. Phu Yen again; Back to Binh Dinh, Thayer I; Irving -- 13. Raising the stakes on the border. North to Kontum; Pleiku battles, Paul Revere I; Paul Revere II -- 14. The 1st Division's war. Toward the rainy season; Thwarting the offensive; The Battle of Minh Thanh Road; Fighting the Phu Loi Battalion; Retargeting the 9th Division -- 15. The 25th Division's war. The struggle for Hau Nghia; To Long An and back; An overview -- 16. Summing up. Operational developments; Benchmarks.|
|520|||aCombat Operations: Stemming the Tide describes a critical chapter in the Vietnam conflict, the first eighteen months of combat by the U.S. Army's ground forces. Relying on official American and enemy primary sources, John M. Carland focuses on initial deployments and early combat and takes care to present a well-balanced picture by discussing not only the successes but also the difficulties endemic to the entire effort. This fine work presents the war in all of its detail: the enemy's strategy and tactics, General William C. Westmoreland's search and destroy operations, the helicopters and airmobile warfare, the immense firepower American forces could call upon to counter Communist control of the battlefield, the out-of-country enemy sanctuaries, and the allied efforts to win the allegiance of the South Vietnamese people to the nation's anti-Communist government. Carland's volume demonstrates that U.S. forces succeeded in achieving their initial goals, but unexpected manpower shortages made Westmoreland realize that the transition from stemming the tide to taking the offensive would take longer. Bruising battles with the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese in the Saigon area and in the Central Highlands had halted their drive to conquest in 1965 and, with major base development activities afoot, a series of high-tempo spoiling operations in 1966 kept them off balance until more U.S. fighting units arrived in the fall. Carland credits the improvements in communications and intelligence, the helicopter's capacity to extend the battlefield, and the availability of enormous firepower as the potent ingredients in Westmoreland's optimism for victory, yet realizes that the ultimate issue of how effective the U.S. Army would be and what it would accomplish during the next phase was very much a question mark.|
|610||10|aUnited States.|bArmy|xHistory|yVietnam War, 1961-1975.|
|650||0|aVietnam War, 1961-1975|zUnited States.|
|650||0|aVietnam War, 1961-1975|xCampaigns.|
|651||7|aGuerre du Viet-Nam (1961-1975)|zÉtats-Unis.|2ram|
|776||08|iOnline version:|aCarland, John M., 1942-|tCombat operations.|dWashington, DC : Center of Military History United States Army, 2000|w(OCoLC)606540638|
|830||0|aUnited States Army in Vietnam.|